Please see my commentary on Amendment 4 below.

Amendment 9 seeks to add a specific workstream titled "Responding to the Needs of the Island's Young People" to the "Foundations for Our Future" area of focus. It directs the Policy & Resources Committee to coordinate a refresh of the Children & Young People's Plan (C&YPP), ensuring it involves direct consultation with young people and third-sector organisations.

While the GWP correctly emphasizes the need for focus via "super priorities," Amendment 9 addresses a critical gap. The GWP's "Early Years and Families" priority focuses heavily on the early stages of life and workforce participation for parents. However, Amendment 9 specifically targets the "voice of a wide range of children, young people and young adults".

The island faces a known challenge in the "retention of talent". By formalising a workstream that requires direct consultation with young adults, the States can develop policies that make Guernsey an attractive place for them to stay and work.

And because it utilises the existing statutory Children & Young People's Plan (C&YPP), it integrates into existing legal frameworks rather than creating a brand-new, redundant bureaucracy.

My slight concern, however, was the estimated cost (supposedly under £100k). Assumming that estimated amount is correct, although it is a relatively small investment for the potential long-term economic benefit of a more engaged and retained workforce, there is a worry that it could be spent on unnecessary external consultant(s) to conduct the surveys.

However, I decided to give this amendment the benefit of the doubt.

I have read all 36 pages of the 2026 - 2029 Government Work Plan (GWP).

This is not about whether one agrees with the direction of policy.

It is about whether the GWP works as an actual plan. Something the public can use to understand:

• what government intends to deliver
• when it will be delivered
• how success will be measured

In my view, the GWP would benefit from being clearer, more measurable, and more explicit about outcomes.

1. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ANNUAL SCRUTINY

The GWP proposes removing the requirement for an annual debate. Instead, it would rely on quarterly written updates and a mid-term report. It also proposes publishing plans separately under Committee Work Plans. That is not ideal. The GWP is the only document that brings together priorities across all Committees in one place.

An annual debate helps to:

• track progress
• identify slippage early
• keep Committees collectively accountable

Pushing detail into separate Committee Work Plans makes it harder for the public to follow what is or is not being delivered.

2. BIG PRIORITIES, BUT VERY FEW NUMBERS

The GWP sets out five "Super Priorities". That is useful in principle. The issue is that most are described in very broad terms, with few measurable targets.

• Tax reform:
  We are told reform is unavoidable, but not...
  • how much revenue is needed
  • what success looks like
  • what balance is expected between different sources of tax
• Leale's Yard:
  Described as transformational, yet it commits to...
  • no housing numbers or targets
  • no affordability levels
  • no indicative prices
  The GWP says these details will be decided later in a site plan. That is not ideal because the GWP is meant to be a dashboard the public can use to judge the government's four-year plan.
• Health and care:
  Although a new Health and Care Strategic Plan is promised, the GWP currently offers...
  • no staffing targets
  • no hospital bed targets
  • no waiting-time benchmarks
  This leaves both the Assembly and the public without interim ways to judge progress.
• Early years:
  Apart from a promise of an overarching framework with "immediate actions", the GWP offers...
  • no concrete examples of what will change
  • no childcare-hour commitments
  • no affordability targets
• Harbours:
  The importance of the harbours is acknowledged. But even though designs are promised before 2029, the GWP gives...
  • no interim milestones
  • no indicative costs
  • no construction start date

3. HOUSING: MISSING INFORMATION

The GWP relies on the separate Guernsey Housing Plan for numbers. But that plan is neither attached nor summarised.

The GWP itself contains...

• no island-wide housing target
• no affordability definition
• no delivery pipeline numbers

Anyone trying to measure progress on housing cannot do so by reading the GWP alone.

4. GEOPOLITICS: HIGHLY RELEVANT BUT IGNORED

One major issue the GWP does not address at all is geopolitical risk. Around 40% of Guernsey's economy depends on finance. That makes global politics such as sanctions, trade disputes, and conflicts between major powers directly relevant to our economic stability. Sanctions are now a routine political tool. Assets can be frozen. Banks can be cut off from payment systems. Financial centres can be pressured to follow decisions made in Washington. This has already happened, including pressure on traditionally neutral jurisdictions like Switzerland.

Guernsey is particularly exposed because...

• it automatically aligns with UK sanctions
• the UK closely aligns with the United States

This is before even considering the impact of AI on finance jobs. If there were a major global conflict with widespread sanctions, especially involving a major power whose goods the island relies on, Guernsey would have very little room to manoeuvre.

The GWP...

• does not acknowledge this risk
• does not stress-test the finance sector
• does not outline any contingency planning

5. ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION: UNDERDEVELOPED

The GWP lists several workstreams intended to broaden the economy:

• Economic Development Strategy
• Finance Sector Policy Framework
• Digital Framework
• Offshore wind next steps

However, it...

• sets no quantified goal for reducing reliance on finance
• assigns no interim milestones
• provides no metrics to judge diversification success

Guernsey's heavy dependence on finance is itself a strategic risk. That deserves far more attention in a document meant to guide the island for four years.

FINAL THOUGHT

The GWP sets out intentions and aspirations. But it often stops short of...

• clear goals
• measurable outcomes
• defined benchmarks for success

A plan without numbers is hard to scrutinise and impossible to fail. Yes, the GWP refers to many other documents. But presenting information in such a fragmented way makes it very difficult for the public to assess progress or measure success.

I tried to fix the GWP's critical flaws through Amendment 4. Unfortunately it was ultimately rejected by the Assembly, thus the GWP remained a government wish list rather than a plan.

For all the reasons above, I voted against the GWP.

The "Sursis Motive" is a procedural motion to suspend (delay) the approval of the Policy & Resources Committee’s proposed Fiscal Policy Framework.

It directs P&R to return to the States by July 15, 2026, with a revised framework that addresses specific concerns raised by the Scrutiny Management Committee (SMC). These concerns include:

• Core Principle: A clearer, consistently applied fiscal principle (moving away from the current ambiguity between "stability" and "balance").
• Measurable Constraints: More transparent rules governing deficits, borrowing, and cash-flow to allow for better compliance assessment.
• Reserves: A more coherent approach to how reserves are treated, accessed, and replenished.
• Governance: Strengthened independence for the Fiscal Policy Panel (FPP), including a more defined remit.

A Fiscal Policy Framework is the "constitutional" document for an island's finances; it must be beyond reproach to maintain international credit credibility and public trust. The SMC's Letter of Comment identifies a critical shift from "rules to discretion". While P&R argues this provides flexibility , the SMC rightly points out that without measurable benchmarks, "discretion is substituted for discipline".

Furthermore, the governance issue is paramount. For a Fiscal Policy Panel to be truly "independent," its work should not be directed solely by the executive body (P&R) it is evaluating. Deferring for six months to ensure the framework has clear "teeth" and truly independent oversight is a small price to pay for a document intended to last for decades.

This amendment seeks to expand an existing workstream in the GWP called "Artificial Intelligence Strategy - Understanding Island Impact".

• The Mandate: It directs the Policy & Resources Committee (P&R) to explore options for the strategic coordination and governance of AI across the Bailiwick.
• Key Feature: It specifically suggests considering a dedicated AI office or equivalent function, modeled after other jurisdictions like the Isle of Man.
• Deadline: Recommendations must be brought back to the States by December 2026.

Why I Voted "FOR":

The GWP itself acknowledges that "rapidly advancing technology" and AI are threats to the Island's foundations. While the main GWP already includes a workstream to "understand" AI impact, understanding is not the same as governing.

The amendment does not mandate immediate spending or the immediate creation of an office; it simply mandates the exploration of options with a clear deadline. Given that AI will touch every committee... from diagnostics in Health to deepfakes in Home Affairs... having a central coordination point is a pragmatic way to avoid the very "duplication of effort" the GWP seeks to eliminate. So this amendment would hopefully provide a proactive rather than reactive stance on a technology that is already "emerging across the Bailiwick".

How the Assembly Voted: 33/40 FOR | 0/40 ABSTAINED | 4/40 AGAINST | 1/40 DID NOT VOTE | 1/40 ABSENT

Overall Vote Result: FOR

This amendment is proposed by me.

The purpose of this amendment is to convert the Government Work Plan from a collection of broad intentions into a clear, transparent, and verifiable roadmap that can be scrutinised by both the public and the Assembly. To achieve this, the amendment requires that the key performance indicators (KPIs) for each priority within the Government Work Plan be made publicly accessible and updated at least once every six months, enabling progress to be tracked and outcomes to be assessed.

Each priority within the Government Work Plan can be understood as a journey with a defined structure:

• Targets - the destination. They define the intended outcome.
• Leading indicators - the speedometer. They show whether progress is sufficient to reach the target.
• Milestones - the signposts. They indicate whether key stages have been reached.
• Metrics - the odometer. They measure the progress achieved to date.

By way of illustration, consider a Government Work Plan priority to reduce hospital waiting times. Translating that objective into practical terms requires clarity:

• The target might be to open 50 additional hospital beds by 2029.
• A milestone could be that the construction contract for a new ward has been signed.
• A metric could state that 5 of the 50 beds have been opened.
• A leading indicator might show that 20 additional nurses are required to open the next ward, while only 5 applications have been received to date.

This amendment is not intended to create additional administrative burden. It concerns the disclosure of management information that should already exist and its presentation in a form that is accessible and comprehensible to the public.

Any priority included in the Government Work Plan should already be supported by KPIs, or at the very least by a standardised KPI framework. The absence of such information would itself be a cause for serious concern.

The amendment requires committees to submit their KPIs to Policy and Resources every six months, enabling P&R to publish them in a single, public-facing format, such as a webpage on gov.gg or a downloadable PDF. This approach involves no material additional cost.

Consolidating all Government Work Plan priorities and their associated KPIs in one location, with regular updates, would improve transparency for the public and significantly enhance the Assembly's ability to monitor delivery.

This level of visibility would support more effective use of public resources, facilitate timely oversight, and allow for corrective action where projects stall or deviate from plan. Above all, it would strengthen public confidence that commitments made by government are followed by measurable delivery.

My Analysis of the Unfortunate Decision of the Assembly:

Guernsey has already experienced the consequences of inadequate oversight and accountability. Forty-two million pounds have been lost to failed IT projects. Relative to population size, this is comparable to losses in the tens of billions in a much larger jurisdiction.

More concerning than the financial loss itself is the absence of clear accountability. Responsibility for these failures has not been conclusively established, and the island has yet to fully recover from the earlier IT programme that exceeded £135 million.

Against this background, the Government Work Plan should represent a decisive break from past practice. It is intended to function as a strategic roadmap for the island over the next four years.

While the Plan contains numerous high-level ambitions, including additional priorities introduced during recent Assembly debates, it lacks the basic performance framework expected of any serious strategic programme.

A Government Work Plan would ordinarily be expected to include, at a minimum, high-level KPIs such as targets, quantitative and qualitative metrics, milestones, and leading indicators. Without these, it is not possible to assess progress or measure success.

In its current form, the Plan spans 36 pages but does not provide the public with any KPIs that allow progress to be tracked or outcomes to be evaluated.

The amendment I proposed was intended to address this fundamental deficiency.

The amendment requested that Policy and Resources publish progress against the Government Work Plan in a single, publicly accessible location, such as a gov.gg webpage or a downloadable PDF.

This publication would include clear targets, leading indicators, milestones, and both qualitative and quantitative metrics, enabling progress to be tracked, audited, and assessed by the public.

The requirement for updates at least every six months reflects standard practice in programme and portfolio management.

Committees should already possess high-level KPIs, or at minimum KPI templates, for the priorities they are responsible for delivering. If such basic management information does not exist, that would raise serious questions about governance and planning.

Accordingly, the amendment was largely about repurposing existing internal management data for public accountability.

This represents a foundational principle of transparent and accountable government.

Despite this, the amendment was opposed by all Committee Presidents except three, as well as by all deputies on Policy and Resources.

The principal objections raised were:

• "It is too time-consuming and expensive!"
• "Not all information can be made public!"
• "Some priorities are still in the exploration stage, so we don't have all the info yet!"
• "KPIs cannot be applied to policy development!"

These objections do not withstand scrutiny.

While some administrative effort would be required to collate and maintain KPIs, modern tools, including AI-assisted reporting, significantly reduce this burden. Publication via an existing government website entails no material cost.

The amendment does not require disclosure of sensitive operational detail. It calls only for the publication of high-level KPI information that the public is entitled to see.

Where elements of the Government Work Plan are at an exploratory stage, projected or indicative KPIs can and should be provided. Any credible project or business plan includes at least provisional targets, milestones, or indicators.

The assertion that KPIs cannot be applied to policy development is particularly concerning. Every policy programme can be broken down into workstreams and action plans, to which KPIs can be attached.

Ultimately, 23 Deputies voted against the amendment, and it did not pass.

The following day, Policy and Resources lodged Amendment 11, an amendment that substantially diluted the original proposal.

In a context where public trust depends on genuine accountability and transparency, this response fell short of what was required.

Nonetheless, I supported the revised amendment, as a limited step toward accountability is preferable to none.

However, without clear, publicly accountable KPIs, particularly leading indicators, the States remain exposed to the risk of repeating past failures.

With a projected deficit approaching one hundred million pounds this year, the island cannot afford further large-scale mismanagement.

This amendment represented an attempt to introduce meaningful transparency and accountability into the Government Work Plan.

Unfortunately without majority support in the Assembly, substantive reform remains difficult.

This amendment seeks to add a specific fiscal mandate to the GWP.

It directs the Policy & Resources Committee to incorporate a structured public service efficiency programme into the Funding and Investment Plan.

The target is a 1% real-terms annual reduction in baseline public expenditure for the years 2027, 2028, and 2029, using 2026 as the baseline year.

Why I Voted "AGAINST":

I opposed this amendment because it lacks sufficient nuance. Although it calls for a modest saving of 1%, it fails to specify where those savings are to be made.

That omission gives Policy & Resources far too much latitude in determining how the saving is achieved.

Staff costs represent one of the States' largest areas of expenditure, so there is a very real risk that any savings would fall there. In practice, senior managers rarely volunteer pay reductions or make themselves redundant to deliver savings. As a result, cuts are far more likely to be imposed at the frontline, where they would directly and adversely affect service delivery.

I would have been willing to support this amendment had it clearly specified that savings should come from senior management costs or from the use of external consultancy.

Unfortunately, like many well-intentioned amendments to the GWP this term, Amendment 7 is overly subjective and insufficiently prescriptive, granting Policy & Resources excessive discretion in how it is interpreted and implemented.

For these reasons, I did not support it.

Amendment 6 asks the States to:

• Establish a Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) Programme: Review material areas of expenditure from "first principles" rather than simply adjusting historical budgets.
• Set a Deadline: Require the scope and initial findings of this programme to be included in the mid-term GWP report.
• Integrate Outcomes: Use the findings to inform future Committee Work Plans, budgets, and major policy decisions for the rest of the term.

The GWP itself admits that Guernsey is facing an unsustainable structural deficit and must make "definitive decisions" on tax reform to protect essential services. Asking the public for more tax revenue (as suggested in the "Tax Reform" super priority) is difficult to justify if the government hasn't first proven it is spending its current budget as efficiently as possible.

Zero-based budgeting may provide the intellectual honesty required to reform public finances. While it is resource-heavy, the amendment is written with flexibility in that it only targets "material areas" of expenditure rather than every single line item, which mitigates the risk of administrative paralysis.

By voting FOR, I hoped that the States' "highest priority" workstreams are funded by choice and merit, rather than by historical accident.

This is a vote to appoint Ms. Sarah Willis and Mr. Steve Wood a voting member of the Data Protection Authority from 1st January 2026 until (and including) 31st December 2029.

My default position on individual appointments/elections is to vote FOR the proposition unless I am made aware of any compelling reasons not to. This is consistent with my principle of assuming good faith unless and until proven otherwise.

Under the 1972 Law, it is generally an offence to land goods or passengers anywhere other than at a port or airport specifically "appointed" by the Committee for Home Affairs (CfHA).

This amendment would introduce a formal concession system. Key provisions include:

• Grant Legal Power: Formally empower the CfHA to grant written "concessions" allowing the loading/unloading of goods and disembarkation of passengers at non-appointed ports for specific periods.
• Establish Controls: Require concessions to specify the authorised persons/bodies and any conditions or restrictions (e.g., limiting items to "personal effects" only).
• Ensure Transparency: Mandate that all granted concessions and related guidance be published on the official States of Guernsey website.
• Enable Fees: Allow the CfHA to charge a fee for granting these concessions.
• Codify Enforcement: Update the law so that landing goods at a non-appointed port without a concession remains a forfeitable offence, but landing them with a valid concession is legally compliant.

The primary objective of this Projet de Loi is not to "open the floodgates," but to formalize existing reality. Currently, the Guernsey Border Agency allows certain trips (like Jersey-to-Sark) out of necessity and common sense, but they are doing so without a modern legislative anchor. Voting FOR this proposition would provide the legal framework necessary for enforcement and transparency.

The Law includes built-in safeguards: the CfHA has the power to revoke concessions, impose strict conditions (like "personal effects only"), and must publish everything publicly. This represents a pragmatic balance between maintaining a secure border and supporting the Bailiwick's tourism economy.

This amendment seeks to modify Proposition 5 of the GWP. Proposition 5 originally directs the Policy & Resources Committee to submit mid-term and end-of-term progress reports.

The amendment adds a requirement that these reports must include specific commentary on how the Plan has:

A) Supported the Island's economic capacity and competitiveness.

B) Addressed trade-offs affecting economic growth, resilience, or productivity.

C) Balanced economic considerations against other policy objectives in the delivery of super priorities.

Why I Voted "FOR":

I voted "FOR" this amendment in the hope that it would provide a "strengthened strategic coherence". In a period where Guernsey faces a structural deficit and significant infrastructure costs, it is vital that the Assembly is forced to look at the economic trade-offs of its decisions.

The GWP already classifies the super priorities as "critical to economic growth"; therefore, requiring a formal report on whether they actually achieved that growth is a logical and necessary step for good governance. It ensures that while we pursue social wellbeing, we remain disciplined about the economic capacity required to pay for it.

Amendment 3 proposes to add a new instruction to the States:

• Mandate the Chief Executive: Formally direct the Chief Executive to lead a priority programme of organisational reform to improve the performance, culture, and capability of the public service.
• External Expertise: Authorise the use of external expertise where appropriate to support this reform.
• Terms of Reference & Funding: Require the Policy & Resources Committee (P&R) to approve clear terms of reference and resource the programme as necessary.
• Accountability: Mandate regular progress reports to the States.

Why I Voted "FOR":

The GWP itself acknowledges that the States have struggled with "significant challenges" in delivering major projects and that current governance can "stymie effective and expeditious delivery". While the five "super priorities" (tax, housing, etc.) are critical, their success depends entirely on the capability of the machine tasked with building them.

By mandating the Chief Executive to lead this reform with "clear terms of reference" and "regular reporting," the amendment may hopefully create a formal mechanism for accountability that is currently less defined in the main GWP. While there is a risk of resource diversion, a "high-performing" public service is the fundamental engine required to achieve any of the other long-term goals outlined in the 2026-2029 plan.

Amendment 2 seeks to explicitly embed economic development as the foundation of the entire GWP. It proposes adding two new propositions that:

• Declare that maintaining economic capacity is fundamental to the success of the GWP.
• Define economic growth, competitiveness, and productivity as "enabling conditions" for all other priorities, rather than a separate or competing objective.
• Mandate that economic consequences be a cross-cutting consideration in all government decision-making, prioritisation, and sequencing.

Why I Voted "FOR":

The GWP itself admits that Guernsey faces a "structural deficit" where expenditure is outpacing revenue. While the GWP lists noble goals like tax reform and health care sustainability, these are defensive measures. Amendment 2 could potentially provide the offensive strategy: it forces the government to treat the economy not as a "competing objective" but as the very engine that makes those social goals possible.

By making economic capacity a "cross-cutting consideration," it is hoped that when Committees make decisions on housing or infrastructure, they are explicitly considering how those decisions impact the Island's ability to remain competitive and productive. This creates a more honest and sustainable framework for government than simply listing desired services without a clear, unified focus on the growth required to sustain them.

1. Deputies should have the same latitude in lawful public and private expression outside Parliament that is enjoyed by every person within the Bailiwick, subject solely to appropriate safeguard(s). Currently, the Code of Conduct has the potential to stifle this freedom by forcing Deputies to walk on egg shells (speech wise) and self-censor when outside of Parliament, thus reducing their effectiveness as the voice of the people.
2. The Code of Conduct contains broad clauses that can be easily weaponised to gag and silence Deputies. This has the potential to hamper Deputies' ability to hold government to account.
3. The Code of Conduct should never be allowed to stifle any freedom of expression that the law permits.
4. The Code of Conduct should not be allowed to function like a "company handbook"; Deputies are not employees of the States. The Commissioner should not have to play the role of "HR". Deputies are representatives of the people. Therefore the Code of Conduct must allow them to do their jobs freely without hindrance as long as they're within the confines of the law.

1. Deputies should have the same latitude in lawful public and private expression outside Parliament that is enjoyed by every person within the Bailiwick, subject solely to appropriate safeguard(s). Currently, the Code of Conduct has the potential to stifle this freedom by forcing Deputies to walk on egg shells (speech wise) and self-censor when outside of Parliament, thus reducing their effectiveness as the voice of the people.
2. The Code of Conduct contains broad clauses that can be easily weaponised to gag and silence Deputies. This has the potential to hamper Deputies' ability to hold government to account.
3. The Code of Conduct should never be allowed to stifle any freedom of expression that the law permits.
4. The Code of Conduct should not be allowed to function like a "company handbook"; Deputies are not employees of the States. The Commissioner should not have to play the role of "HR". Deputies are representatives of the people. Therefore the Code of Conduct must allow them to do their jobs freely without hindrance as long as they're within the confines of the law.

1. Deputies should have the same latitude in lawful public and private expression outside Parliament that is enjoyed by every person within the Bailiwick, subject solely to appropriate safeguard(s). Currently, the Code of Conduct has the potential to stifle this freedom by forcing Deputies to walk on egg shells (speech wise) and self-censor when outside of Parliament, thus reducing their effectiveness as the voice of the people.
2. The Code of Conduct contains broad clauses that can be easily weaponised to gag and silence Deputies. This has the potential to hamper Deputies' ability to hold government to account.
3. The Code of Conduct should never be allowed to stifle any freedom of expression that the law permits.
4. The Code of Conduct should not be allowed to function like a "company handbook"; Deputies are not employees of the States. The Commissioner should not have to play the role of "HR". Deputies are representatives of the people. Therefore the Code of Conduct must allow them to do their jobs freely without hindrance as long as they're within the confines of the law.

1. Tax Fairness: Tax loopholes for the wealthy remain open, and there are no deterrents against property hoarding, such as a monthly levy on vacant properties. Consequently, the government misses out on vital tax revenues.
2. Spending Efficiency: The States' apparatus remains excessively top-heavy and fails to curb frivolous spending, such as on consultants. This mismanagement steadily depletes government coffers.
3. Economic Diversification: The government lacks a serious plan to develop industries beyond finance. As a result, Guernsey now lacks the human capital necessary to diversify its economy.
4. Global Outreach: The States have failed to pursue new opportunities and investments outside the UK and Europe. This has caused Guernsey to miss out on investment from the largest and fastest-growing economies in the East.

• Petrol down from 90.5 p to 88.8 p/l
• Marine petrol 61.4 p to 60.3 p/l
• Gas-oil & biodiesel rates cut correspondingly

This is simply to approve the schedule for the States' business for the 4th of November 2025 (Special Meeting) and 26th of November 2025 (Ordinary Meeting).

This is a vote on the Projet...

• to dissolve a trust established by the Country Hospital Charitable Fund Law, 1958, and
• to transfer all its real and personal property (including any income arising from the trust property as well as all rights and liabilities acquired or incurred for the trust) from the President of the Committee for Employment & Social Security to the President of the Committee for Health and Social Care, and
• to ensure that the transferred assets be used to fund equipment at a facility for short break and respite services for children with disabilities called the Croft, and
• for the remainder of the asset to be given to the Friends of the Princess Elizabeth Hospital

I do not see any issue with the above.

This is a vote on the amendment proposed in P.2025/109 (which was further amended in P.2025/109 Amdt 1). The gist of this amendment is to grant to the Committee for Employment and Social Security the power to make regulations in order to regulate and control certain work related activities that the Committee deem:

• involve significant hazards or risk, or
• engender significant public concern

Opposition to this amendment claimed that it would lead to over-regulation and result in the need to hire more civil servants to manage and enforce the regulations, etc.

While I agree that over-regulation is undesirable, this is not the instance to demonstrate one's disdain for "big government" by broadly rejecting an entire amendment, especially when it relates to health and safety.

Moreover, if the Assembly, at any point in the future is presented with a specific regulation that is (in the opinion of the Assembly) unnecessary and onerous, then that specific regulation can be annuled when it is laid before the Assembly.

This proposition is simply to note (i.e. acknowledge) the Guernsey Police Complaints Commission 2024 Annual Report.

A motion to debate the report was also lodged by certain Deputies.

Side Note: For some reason, this proposition was not given a number (e.g. P.2025/xx).

This is essentially a proposition to change the date of the Assembly's next meeting from Wednesday 24th September 2025 to Thursday 25th September 2025.

I supported the proposition because it was only a minor date change and I believe the Assembly needs to be flexible enough to adapt to circumstances if required.

This is simply to approve the schedule for the States' business for the 25th of September 2025 (amended from 24th September 2025).

This is a vote to confirm the appointment of four members of the Independent Monitoring Panel (Committee for Home Affairs).

I do not personally know any of the individuals. My knowledge is limited to what was disclosed during the proposition debate.

My default position on individual appointments is to vote FOR the proposition unless I am made aware of any compelling reasons not to. This is consistent with my principle of assuming good faith unless and until proven otherwise.

This is a vote to agree to the appointment of a certain individual as Public Trustee for a further term of five years (Committee for Economic Development).

I do not personally know the individual. My knowledge is limited to what was disclosed during the proposition debate.

My default position on individual appointments is to vote FOR the proposition unless I am made aware of any compelling reasons not to. This is consistent with my principle of assuming good faith unless and until proven otherwise.

This is a motion to debate the Guernsey Police Complaints Commission 2024 Annual Report.

My default position is to support any motions to debate unless there is a compelling reason not to.

This Amendment to the principal ordinance Driving Licences (Guernsey) Ordinance, 1995 adds new offences to an existing list. If a driver is convicted of one of these offences and the court revokes their licence, they will have to pass their driving test again before getting a new one.

Relevant laws: Road Traffic (Causing Death or Serious Injury by Driving) (Guernsey) Law, 2025, the Road Traffic (Guernsey) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025, and the Road Traffic (Drink Driving) (Guernsey) Law, 1989 (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025.

I have read through the list of new offences in the Amendment and found nothing unreasonable.

This Amendment amends the Education (Guernsey) Law, 1970 to replace committees of management for primary and secondary schools with the governance boards proposed in the previous Assembly's P.2024/112 Education Governance Policy Letter.

Some members of the public and several Deputies have expressed concern that the Amendment lacks certain details, potentially creating governance boards with unclear responsibilities and authorities. They argue this could result in ineffective "talking shops" without real power. Consequently, some Deputies have lodged a sursis motivé to delay implementation so that any perceived lack can be addressed first.

The Committee for Education, Sport & Culture contends that establishing the governance boards should not be delayed. They assert that responsibilities and authorities which currently appear unclear will be clarified and defined as time goes by.

Having reviewed both the Amendment and the P.2024/112 Policy Letter, I conclude that concerns about governance boards becoming powerless "talking shops" due to initially undefined responsibilities are somewhat exaggerated.

The responsibilities and authorities of these boards should not be static from the outset. They must evolve and adapt to meet the rapidly changing requirements of education.

This means that currently defined responsibilities may need to be modified or replaced over time, making the concern about initial clarity less substantive.

Side Note:

Should key aspects of education be controlled centrally by government or delegated to governance boards?

My perspective is straightforward: it depends on competency. If the government demonstrates high competence, it should retain appropriate authority to manage education effectively. If government competence is lacking, then governance boards comprising community members should be empowered to make key educational decisions.

See explanation in P.2025/104 above.

This is simply to note (i.e. acknowledge) the Guernsey Financial Services Commission's 2024 annual report and accounts.

Key issues with the amendment...

1. Outdated Foundation:
   The original The Computer Misuse (Bailwick of Guernsey) Law, 1991 predates widespread internet use and modern digital infrastructure. While updates are needed, this amendment risks compounding existing flaws.
2. Overly Broad Language:
   The proposal could criminalise routine uses of web technologies and AI development tools. For example:
   • Ambiguous definitions of "recklessness" (in IT context)
   • Unintended liability for benign API usage
3. Chilling Effects:
   The "recklessness" standard is inappropriate for technical contexts. In practice, this could:
   • Deter IT firms from servicing Guernsey clients
   • Stifle innovation in our emerging tech sector
4. Missed Opportunity:
   Rather than patching a 34-year-old law, we need a completely new framework tailored to:
   • Modern cybercrime threats
   • Proportional liability for developers
   • Clear safe harbours for good-faith operators

In summary...

This amendment fails to balance security with innovation. Until these issues are addressed through proper consultation with our tech sector, I cannot support legislation that might:

• Criminalise ordinary IT operations
• Expose developers to frivolous litigation
• Further disadvantage Guernsey's digital economy

In fact, I used my maiden speech in parliament to address the issues and urged my colleagues to vote against the amendment.

Key issues with the amendment...

1. Illogical Distinction:
   The amendment maintains an illogical distinction between "domestic" knives (exempt) and, for example, historical blades (restricted):
   • Example: A 20cm kitchen knife can be sold to minors, while a 15cm Viking replica cannot
2. Unclear Applications:
   Fails to address, for example...
   • Carrying wooden training weapons for martial arts
   • Educational, historical, and martial arts websites (accessible to anybody) featuring arms (which may be for sale)
3. Practical Consequences:
   
   • Harms cultural heritage, history and martial arts groups
   • Creates traps for legitimate businesses
   • Diverts police resources

In summary...

This amendment:

• Wrongly prioritises optics by banning "scary-looking" items while ignoring real risks posed by domestic items (e.g. kitchen knives) that could equally be used as weapons
• Lacks clarity for educators, reenactors, martial arts practitioners and retailers

Every elected Member represents a distinct constituency voice. When that voice is silenced through resignation or incapacity, democratic integrity requires immediate replacement, not an arbitrary wait for multiple vacancies.

Key flaws in the proposal...

1. Democratic Deficit:
   • Leaves constituents unrepresented for extended periods
   • Concentrates power among remaining Members
2. False Economy:
   • Claims of cost savings ignore the real price of:
     • Reduced constituent services
     • Imbalanced Assembly representation
3. Better Solutions Exist:
   • Online/mail voting (which could cost significantly less than in-person voting)
   • Consolidated polling stations

In summary...

This reform:

• Prioritises convenience over democracy
• Misses modernisation opportunities (e.g. to use a byelection to test the viability of online voting)

This is simply to approve the schedule for the States' business for the 3rd of September 2025.

Key considerations for abstention...

1. Procedural Reality:
   This was effectively a retrospective vote on financial statements where:
   • The outcome wouldn't alter already-executed expenditures
   • No corrective mechanism existed for any identified issues
2. Conflicting Claims:
   Significant unresolved questions emerged during scrutiny:
   • Public concerns about omitted items in reporting
   • Policy & Resources' assertion of IPSAS compliance
3. Verification Challenge:
   The debate timeframe made proper due diligence impossible regarding:
   • Completeness of financial disclosures
   • Technical accounting standards application

In summary...

This abstention reflects principled caution rather than indifference. When:

• Material questions remain unanswered about financial reporting
• No practical remedy exists through the voting mechanism
• Technical verification requires more time than allocated

...the responsible position is to withhold endorsement while acknowledging the work done under current standards.

Key issues addressed by this motion...

1. Seniority-Pay Mismatch:
   The existing system creates an inconsistent standard where:
   • Committee Presidents face Assembly questioning, but
   • P&R Members (despite greater seniority and pay compared to an ordinary, non-president Deputy) do not
2. Transparency Imperative:
   Greater power and remuneration demand greater accountability through:
   • Clear articulation of policy priorities
   • Answers to Assembly concerns

In summary...

This change corrects a double standard in our scrutiny process:

• Seniority Principle: P&R Members direct island-wide policy - their appointments warrant greater scrutiny, not less
• Pay Transparency: Higher remuneration should correlate with stricter vetting
• Judgment Evaluation: Open questioning allows the Assembly to evaluate candidates' judgment